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Abstract
This paper examines the long-run performance of the Malaysian initial pub-
lic offerings (IPOs) listed in the Main and ACE alternative markets at econ-
omy and industry level. Using event-time and calendar-time approaches, we
provide novel evidence on whether IPOs investments in the Main Malaysian
stock market has superior performance compared with the ACE (alternative)
market, and whether sector-specific characteristics differ from the aggregate
market characteristics in predicting and determining the IPOs performance
for eight discrete sector groupings. Using monthly data for the period Jan-
uary 2000 to December 2011, our results from the event- and calendar-time
approaches confirm that underperformance anomaly exists in the Malaysian
market, and the underperformance is more intense in the ACE market. In
addition, we found that the overall underperformance is dominated by per-
formance associated with the Consumer Products and Industrial firms, while
the Construction, Property and Technology firms significantly overperform.
The findings are robust to a wide range of other sensitivity checks including
parametric and non-parametric tests.
Keywords: Initial public offerings (IPOs); Long-run performance;
Underperformance; Emerging economy.
JEL Classification: G14, G15, G30, G34, G32, G38.
1 Introduction
The long-run abnormal performance of initial public offering (IPOs) is widely
reported in the literature. One possible explanation for long-run underperformance
is the divergence of opinion hypothesis proposed by Miller and Reilly (1987), which
assumes investors to be optimistic about the future cash flow and growth potential
of an IPO. Overoptimism drives investors to value the IPO stocks at higher than
their intrinsic values and as more information are revealed over time, the optimistic
investors will downward-adjust the stock valuation towards its intrinsic values and
this narrows the divergence of opinion between optimistic and pessimistic investors.
As stock price drops, return subsequently drops in the long-run and Ritter (1991)
hypothesised that IPOs with the highest initial returns will perform worst in the
long-run.
The ongoing debates revolve around whether underperformance exists and
if the abnormal returns are sensitive to the method employed in calculating the
stock returns. A more recent strand of research conducted in the area extended
the analysis by comparing the abnormal performance of IPOs across countries,
types of IPOs and listing boards to better understand if IPOs behaviour may be
attributed to different characteristics.
Gregory et al. (2010) conducted a study on IPOs listed on the main and alter-
native boards of the London Stock Exchange and found that although IPOs on all
markets underperform, the Main market beats the performance of the alternative
boards. Vismara et al. (2012) conducted a similar study by comparing IPOs listed
on different boards in France, Germany and Italy and find similar behaviour in
France and Italy. In Germany, however, the Alternative Market IPOs perform bet-
ter than the Main market IPOs. In the context of developing countries, Komenkul
et al. (2012) have considered the Thai market and find that the IPOs in the Mar-
ket for Alternative Investments (MAI) outperform their Main market (known as
the Securities Exchange of Thailand) counterparts. Komenkul et al. (2012) em-
ploy the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and buy-and-hold return (BHAR)
approaches using different benchmarks to in calculating the IPO abnormal returns
and find that the results tend to differ based on the adopted method.
In the Malaysian market, the alternative market was established in 2002 as
the MESDAQ Market. The market provides a listing avenue for younger, smaller
and growth-driven firms. In 2009, the MESDAQ Market was renamed ACE (”Ac-
cess, Certainty and Efficiency”) Market. The differences between the two markets
are in terms of size, age and financial status and the listing requirements are more
stringent for the Main market. The leniency for the ACE market listing imply that
the stocks carry more ex ante uncertainties compared to their Main market coun-
terparts. Furthermore, most of the ACE market stocks are from the technology
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sector, that are often associated with higher ex ante risks. Hence, it is expected
that the IPOs listed in the two markets will portray different long-run behaviour.
Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect (2012) studied the long-run performance of the MESDAQ
Market IPOs. To date, no studies provide a direct comparison between the Main
and the ACE markets. Hence, this study fills the gap.
We further supplement the literature by comparing the three-year abnormal
returns by sector grouping. Commonly, the literature compare between technol-
ogy IPOs to their non-technology counterparts (see Gao and Jain (2011); Saade
(2015) among others). Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) study cross-sectional returns
of Malaysian IPOs by sector grouping. We take a step further by comparing the
abnormal returns for three years.
Our next contribution lies in terms of methodology where we ensure robust-
ness in our abnormal returns models by applying the self-constructed size/book-
to-market matching portfolio and industry indices as benchmark, on top of the
traditional market index. We employ both parametric and non-parametric tech-
niques to determine the significance of abnormal returns. Further, for calendar-
time approach, we employ three asset pricing models, namely, Fama-French 3-
Factor model, Carhart Momentum model and liquidity-adjusted capital asset pric-
ing model. Our study focuses on newer data set, using IPOs listed from January
2000 to December 2011.
The Malaysian context deserves attention as it is the third best emerging econ-
omy behind China and South Korea (Bloomberg, 2014) and ranked 20th in the
Global Competitiveness Index 2014, being one of the only two South East Asian
economies along with Singapore, that made it in the Top 20 (Schwab, 2014). Fur-
thermore, Malaysian GDP growth rate of 4.7% is said to be expanding faster than
Singapore (3.9%) and Thailand (1.8%) (World Bank, 2015). The Malaysian capi-
tal market is also forecasted to grow at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR)
of 8.5% from 2010 to 2020 (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2011) and expected
to double in size from MYR1.28 trillion in 2010 (USD366 billion) to MYR2.43 tril-
lion (USD695 billion) in 2020. Furthermore, the Malaysian government continues
to improve its economic policies to accommodate the dynamic global economic
climates to ensure that the capital market remains attractive to foreign direct
investors.
Our main analysis indicates that the underperformance anomaly exists in
the Malaysian market, and the magnitude is higher in the ACE market. We
further find the magnitudes of long-run underperformance to change when different
methods are employed. Our calendar-time analysis consistently shows evidence of
underperformance in Malaysian IPOs in both the whole market and segmented
markets. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The following
section discusses the framework of IPO long-run abnormal performance. Section
3
3 describes the data and methodology employed in the current study. Sections 4
and 5 present empirical findings using event-time and calendar-time approaches,
respectively. The final section concludes the paper.
2 The Framework of IPO Long-Run Abnormal
Returns
One of the main anomalies of initial public offerings (IPOs) is the long-run
underperformance, i.e., the IPOs exhibiting poorer performance in comparison
to their benchmarks. The majority of the studies provide empirical evidence of
underperformance. Studies also show that the level of abnormal returns is sensitive
to the methodologies employed in calculating the performance of IPOs.
The early finding of Ritter (1991) triggers global attention on this strand of
research. More recent studies in the US market consistently document long-run
under-performance the US IPOs (Eckbo and Norli, 2005; Gao and Jain, 2011; Brau
et al., 2012), thus supporting Ritter (1991). Similar studies conducted across the
global market, such as in the UK (Khurshed et al., 1999; Espenlaub et al., 2000),
Spain (A´lvarez and Gonza´lez, 2005), Germany (Bessler and Thies, 2006), Japan
(Kirkulak, 2008) and Mauritius (Agathee et al., 2014), all report poor long-run
abnormal performance of IPOs.
Although the majority of the literature report underperformance, overper-
formance are being reported in markets such as Australia (da Silva Rosa et al.,
2003), Indonesia (Emasari and Tamara, 2010), and France and Italy (Vismara
et al., 2012). The mixed evidence may be attributed to market characteristics,
time period of study, or methodological factor. The literature suggests that the
magnitude, direction and statistical significance of IPO long-run abnormal re-
turns are sensitive to the methods employed in measuring the returns (Kothari
and Warner, 1997; Fama, 1998). A change in method, benchmark or weight-
ing measurement, may cause the abnormal performance to change. For example,
Chorruk and Worthington (2010), Emasari and Tamara (2010), Erdogan (2010),
Thomadakis et al. (2012) and Agathee et al. (2014) document that cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) may vary from buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
when the same benchmark is used. On the other hand, large variations in ab-
normal returns across different benchmarks are documented by Espenlaub et al.
(2000), Drobetz et al. (2005), Gregory et al. (2010), Gao and Jain (2011) and Brau
et al. (2012). Further, equal-weighting of abnormal returns may produce different
abnormal returns from value-weighting, as documented by Levis (1993), Kooli and
Suret (2004), Locke and Gupta (2009), Erdogan (2010) and Agathee et al. (2014).
The event-time approach carries some limitations. Fama (1998) and Mitchell
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and Stafford (2000), highlight that event-time approach suffers from cross-sectional
correlations amongst individual firms, hence suggesting the use of calendar-time
approach to mitigate such potential misspecification. Fama and French (1993)
3-Factor Model is commonly employed due to the notion that firm size and book-
to-market effects play a role in explaining stock returns. Previous studies also
document that the long-run underperformance documented using event-time ap-
proach disappear when calendar-time approach is used (Levis, 1993; Erdogan,
2010; Moshirian et al., 2010; Su and Bangassa, 2011), among others. In con-
trast, Mazouz et al. (2008) find consistent evidence of underperformance using the
calendar-time approach.
The more recent strand of research focuses on comparative analysis between
two groups of IPOs, segmented by firm characteristics related to ex-ante uncer-
tainties such as listing boards. Gregory et al. (2010) and Vismara et al. (2012)
conduct comparative analysis on IPOs listed in the Main markets and alterna-
tive markets in the UK and European countries (France, Germany and Italy),
respectively. Such studies allow further understanding on the effects of market
characteristics on long-run aftermarket performance of the IPOs. Gregory et al.
(2010) report that IPOs listed in the UK’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
perform poorer than the Main market IPOs in 36-month period using equally-
weighted BHAR. Vismara et al. (2012) report similar findings in France and Italy,
indicating that larger IPOs perform better than smaller IPOs. Conversely, in the
German market, Alternative Market IPOs perform better than the Main market
IPOs (Vismara et al., 2012).
In the context of emerging market, Komenkul et al. (2012) adopt a similar
approach by comparing 36-month abnormal performance of Thai IPOs listed in the
main and alternative markets, known as Securities Exchange of Thailand (SET)
and the Market for Alternative Investments (MAI), respectively. They report that
MAI IPOs outperform their SET counterparts, consistent with the findings of
Vismara et al. (2012) in the German market.
In short, the debates in the literature of IPO long-run abnormal performance
revolve around whether underperformance exists in the focal market(s) around the
study period, and how methodology causes variations in the abnormal performance
level. Some studies offer further insights with comparative analysis between two
or more groups of IPOs.
Comparative analysis between two listing boards is still non-existent in the
Malaysian market. Previous studies that conduct comparative analysis focus on
privatisation vs. non-privatisation IPOs (Paudyal et al., 1998), and growth vs.
value IPOs (Corhay et al., 2002). Other studies tend to focus either on the entire
market or on one listing board (Jelic et al., 2001; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007;
Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect, 2012). Generally, in the Malaysian context, studies that
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are robust in terms of methodology, is still scant. By far, the most methodologically
robust study in the Malaysian context is that of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007),
whereby they employ both event- and calendar-time approaches and use different
benchmarks and weighting methods.
Previous studies in Malaysia (Corhay et al., 2002; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007;
Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect, 2012) show variations in results when using different
methods, indicating that the abnormal returns of Malaysian IPOs are as sensitive
to the methodology as IPOs in other markets. The majority of the literature show
no evidence of underperformance in the Malaysian market. Paudyal et al. (1998),
Jelic et al. (2001), Corhay et al. (2002) and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007), among
others, report overperformance in Malaysian IPOs. These studies focus on the
Main market IPOs. However, a recent study by Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect (2012)
show evidence of long-run underperformance in the MESDAQ Market (currently
known as the ACE market). It is worthy to mention that the majority of the
existing studies cover the period pre-2000, prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
In the pioneer study that focuses on the MESDAQ Market, Ahmad-Zaluki
and Kect (2012) highlights the possible influence of listing board on IPO long-run
abnormal returns. The difference in long-run behaviours of IPOs listed in the Main
market and the ACE market is not yet documented in the literature. Hence, it is
worthy to conduct a comparative analysis on the long-run abnormal performance
of IPOs listed in the two markets. This study fills the gap in the literature by
attempting to determine whether the IPOs listed in the Main and ACE markets
portray different long-run behaviours.
We further contribute to the literature by extending the work of Ahmad-
Zaluki et al. (2007) by constructing a new benchmark portfolio based on size and
book-to-market mimicking the small- minus-big (SML) and high-minus-low (HML)
factors of Fama and French (1993) 3-Factor (FF3F) model. We attempt to examine
how Malaysian IPOs perform in comparison to firms with similar size and BTM
characteristics. The reference portfolio portfolio construction in the Malaysian
market using this approach is novel to this study. In addition, we also study
industry effect on long-run abnormal return of IPOs. For calendar-time approach,
we employ three asset pricing models. First, we employ the Fama and French
(1993) (FF3F) model to consider the impact of size and book-to-market values in
long-run abnormal returns. Next, we employ the Carhart (1997) Momentum model
(MOM) that considers the impact of security returns in the previous period on the
IPO returns, and liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (L-CAPM) that
considers the impact of stock liquidity on IPO long-run abnormal performance.
We further contribute to the literature by incorporating the three asset pricing
models in the calendar-time analysis. This study is the first to employ MOM and
LCAPM in the Malaysian environment.
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Finally, we focus on newer data set using IPOs listed from January 2000 to
December 2011. Since the full recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998,
the Malaysian economy has grown dramatically. Hence, by using a more recent
set of data, we provide current insights of development of Malaysian IPO market
in particular, and the Malaysian capital market in general.
To summarise, the primary objective of this study is to test the hypothesis that
in the long-run, Malaysian IPOs show negative abnormal performance. Secondly,
this study is conducted to determine whether IPOs behave differently when listed
in markets with distinct characteristics. Thirdly, we attempt to determine whether
the IPO long-run abnormal returns in Malaysia are sensitive to the method in
calculating the returns.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Segmentations of Bursa Malaysia
Since the deregulation of the Malaysian Capital Market in 1996, it has expe-
rienced tremendous development. Previously known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange (KLSE), the Malaysian capital market became Bursa Malaysia in 2004.
Securities are listed in two distinct markets, the Main and the ACE markets. In
this study, we conduct comparative analysis of 36-month performance of the Main
and ACE markets IPOs.
The Main and ACE markets are different in a number of aspects, with the
main difference being size. As at 31 December 2104, the total market capitali-
sation of Bursa Malaysia was MYR1,643 billion (USD470 billion), comprised of
MYR1,633 billion (USD467 billion) Main market securities and MYR9.7 billion
(USD 2.8 billion) ACE market securities. Of the total 906 stocks listed on Bursa
Malaysia, where 799 (88.2%) listed in the Main market, and 107 (11.8%) in the
ACE market.
In terms of age, the ACE market is considerably ‘young’ as it has only been
established in 2002, originally named as MESDAQ Market and subsequently re-
named as the ACE market in 2008. The market serves as a listing platform for
smaller and younger firms that have been established in less than three years. The
ACE market firms consisting of technology firms.
Firms seeking listing on the Main market are subject to different requirements
than the ACE market in terms of financial history, market capitalisation and IPO
price. To qualify for listing on the Main market, a firm must have an uninterrupted
profit after tax (PAT) for a minimum of three financial years with a minimum
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aggregate of MYR20 million (USD5.72 million) and a minimum PAT of MYR6
million (USD1.72) for the most recent financial year. A firm must also have a
minimum market capitalisation of MYR500 million (USD143 million) upon listing,
and has been incorporated for at least one financial year prior to the submission
of listing application. The firm must also have generated operating revenue for
the financial year prior to the listing application. In terms of IPO pricing, a Main
market IPO must be priced at a minimum of MYR0.50.
There are no minimum requirements for ACE market firms in terms of the
above criteria. ACE market firms tend to be younger, smaller and less financially
established than their Main market counterparts. The Main market firms are
more diverse in terms of industry membership, while the ACE market firm mainly
belong to the technology sector, hence driven by high growth.
The different characteristics and listing requirements between the Main and
ACE markets indicate that stocks listed in respective markets carry different risk
profiles. For example, ACE market stocks appear to be riskier, hence investors
would expect higher returns to adequately compensate for the associated level of
risks borne by them.
3.1.2 Description and Sources of Data
The data used in this study are IPOs listed in Bursa Malaysia from January
2000 to December 2011. January 2000 was chosen as the start of the study period
because the Malaysian market had just recovered from the 1998 Asian Financial
Crisis. A total of 476 IPOs were listed in Bursa Malaysia during the whole study
period. We exclude financial services (including banking, investment houses and
insurance companies), real estate and real estate investment trusts IPOs from the
sample due to differences in financial reporting requirements.
The filtration resulted in exclusion of 28 IPOs. The final sample size is 448
IPOs, representing 94.12% of the total Malaysian IPOs listed during the study
period. Out of this final sample, 296 (66.07%) and 152 (33.93%) IPOs are listed
on the Main and ACE markets, respectively. Two IPO firms that were delisted
within less than 36 months are also included to avoid survivorship bias.
Table 1 represents the sample distribution by year and industry, segregated
by listing boards. As indicated in Panel A, the maximum number of IPO sample
is in year 2005 (n = 72) while the minimum is in 2009 (n = 14). The highest and
lowest number of sample from the Main market is n = 43 (2002) and (n = 11)
(2009), respectively. From the ACE market, the highest is (n = 46), appearing in
2005, while the lowest is (n = 3), appearing in 2007 and 2009.
[ Insert Table 1 about here ]
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As can be seen in Panel B in Table 1, IPO samples cover eight sector groupings,
namely Construction, Consumer Products, Industrial, Heavy Machinery,1 Plantation,
Property, Technology, and Trading and Services. When IPO samples are segregated by
sector, the maximum number of sample comes from the Industrial sector (n = 138),
while the minimum comes from the construction sector (n = 7). The majority of the
Main market sample is from the Industrial sector (n = 110) and the lowest is from the
Heavy Machinery sector (n = 5). In contrast, the majority of the firms listed in the
ACE market is from the technology sector (n = 80) with no firms from the construction,
plantation and property sectors.
The data are obtained from a number of sources. IPO offer prices are obtained
from the Information Department of Bursa Malaysia. Share prices, the market-to-book
equity values, market capitalisations, and the market and industry indices prices are
obtained from Datastream.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Model of Abnormal Returns
We investigate the long-run performance of IPO stocks from month 1 to 36 post-
listing, excluding the initial returns due to the abnormally high returns that are often
found in the first trading day IPOs. The monthly raw returns of stock i, Ri is identified
using the closing price of stock i at the end of the last trading day of month t, Pit.
2
The benchmark-adjusted abnormal return (AR) of IPO stock i is the difference between
monthly raw return (Rit) and a monthly benchmark return (Rmt), excluding the initial
returns. Therefore, ARit is identified as:
ARit = Rit −Rmt (1)
In our analysis, we employ the market index as benchmark. Rmt in Equation
1 represents the market returns. We use the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur
Composite Index (FBM KLCI) to benchmark the Main market IPOs, while ACE market
IPOs are benchmarked against the FTSE Bursa Malaysia ACE Index (FBM ACE). It is
well documented in the literature that abnormal returns are sensitive to the benchmark
used (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 2004). As there is no consensus on
the most accurate benchmark, this highlights the importance of testing multiple models
to control for potential misspecification and to compare the sensitivity of outcomes. In
this study, we use reference portfolio matching portfolio, and industry indices returns as
alternative benchmarks.
1The official sector name as per Bursa Malaysia is Industrial Products. However, to avoid
confusion, the name Heavy Machinery is used in this study.Heavy Machinery
2The raw return of an IPO stock is calculated as: Rit = (Pit−Pit−1)/Pit−1, where Rit is the
closing price of IPO at the end of last trading day of month t, and Pit−1 is the closing price of
IPO at the end of last trading day of month t− 1. One month consists of 21 trading days.
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3.2.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is a traditional performance measure (Rit-
ter, 1991; Fama and French, 1993). The CAR from event month q to event month s is
the summation of the mean benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns during the 36-month
aftermarket period. The cumulative abnormal returns involves monthly rebalancing of
the portfolio to achieve equal weighting each month. The mean benchmark-adjusted
abnormal returns in event month t, ARt is the equally-weighted arithmetic mean of the
benchmark-adjusted returns, calculated as follows:
ARt =
1
n
s∑
i=1
ARit (2)
The CAR is consequently calculated using the following formula:
CARq,s =
s∑
t=q
ωiARt (3)
where ω is the equal or value weighting of the abnormal returns.3
To estimate whether the CARs are significantly different from n = 0, we employ
conventional t-statistic. For the CAR in event month t, CAR1,t is:
CARt,month =
CARi,t
σ(CARi,t/
√
n
(4)
where σ is the standard deviation of the abnormal return in the sample, and n is the
number of IPOs in event month t.
3.2.3 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
BHAR approach does not involve monthly rebalancing of portfolios. It is assumed
that the securities are held from the purchase date up to the selling date, reflecting
the actual experience of investors. In this study, we assume 36-month holding period
starting from the day after the listing day. We exclude listing day due to the abnormally
high initial returns usually found in the first listing day. BHAR is used to mitigate the
potential upwards bias in CAR due to the accumulation of the monthly abnormal returns,
as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (2006). Following
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995), buy-and-hold returns for IPO stock i is defined as the
geometrically compounded return on the stock in time t and identified as:
BHRi,T =
min(T,delist)∏
t=start
(1 + rit)− 1
 ∗ 100% (5)
3The equal weighting is calculated as 1/n, where n is the number of IPO firms in each
event month. The value weighting is calculated as MVi/
∑
MVi, where MVi is the market
capitalisation of IPO firm i on the first trading day, and
∑
MVi the total market capitalisation
of all IPO on the first trading day.
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where ri is the monthly raw return on IPO stock i in event month t, start is the first
event listing month, and min(T, delist) is the earlier of the 36-months window or the
final month of listed trading.
The mean buy-and-hold returns for IPO stocks and the benchmarks are calculated
as follows:
BHRT =
n∑
i=1
ωiBHRiT (6)
Consequently, the benchmark-adjusted buy-and-hold return for IPO stock i for holding-
period T , BHARiT is calculated as:
BHARiT =
min(T,delist)∏
t=start
(1 + rit)− 1
−
min(T,delist)∏
t=start
(1 + rmt)− 1
 (7)
where rit is the IPO stock’s monthly raw return and rmt is the benchmark monthly return
at time t. An overperformance (underperformance) over the benchmark is indicated by
a positive (negative) BHAR value.
As long-run abnormal returns suffer from potential skewness bias (Lyon et al.,
1999), we employ Johnson (1978) bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics to deter-
mine whether the abnormal returns are significantly different from zero, using:
tsa =
√
n
(
S +
1
3
γˆS2 +
1
6n
γˆ
)
(8)
where:
S =
BHAR
σ(BHARt)
(9)
and
γˆ =
∑n
i=1
(
BHARi,t −BHARt
)3
nσ(BHARt)3
(10)
3.2.4 Wealth Relatives (WR)
Following Ritter (1991), we calculate wealth relatives (WR) which refers to the
ratio of the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of issuers to the end-of-period
wealth from holding a portfolio of matching companies or market benchmarks. Wealth
relative serves as an indicator of overall long-run relative performance, and calculated s:
WR =
1 +BHRi,36
1 +BHRm,36
(11)
where BHRi,36 is the 36-month buy-and-hold returns of IPO i and BHRm,36 is the 36-
month buy-and-hold returns of the respective benchmarks. A wealth relative of higher
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than 1.00 indicates overperformance, while value of less than 1.00 indicates underperfor-
mance.
3.2.5 Alternative Benchmark - Size/Book-to-Market Reference Port-
folio
Following Komenkul et al. (2012), the size/book-to-market matching portfolios
were constructed using the value-weighted average returns on six portfolios derived from
the FF3F model: Big-High (BH), Big-Medium (BM), Big-Low (BL), Small-High (SH),
Small-Medium (SM) and Small-Low (SL). We follow Fama and French (1993) procedure
in constructing portfolios for the size4 and book-to-market equity (BTM)5.
3.2.6 Alternative Benchmarks - Industry Indices
In addition to listing board effect, we further study the industry impact on IPO long-
run abnormal returns. The IPOs are segregated into eight sectors as per Bursa Malaysia
classifications, as illustrated in Table 1. The industry-adjusted abnormal return (AR)
of IPO stock i is the difference of its monthly raw return (Rit) with a monthly industry
indices return (Rst), excluding the initial returns. Here, the industry-adjusted AR is
calculated as:
ARit = Rit −Rst (12)
where Rst is the monthly industry index returns of the sector in which the IPOs are first
listed in. The sector indices are as per FTSE Bursa Malaysia Industry Indices for each
of the eight industries are listed in Table 1.
3.2.7 Calendar-Time Approach
Event-time approach suffers from cross-sectional correlations amongst individual
securities (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Gao and Jain, 2011). Therefore, the
statistical significance of mean abnormal returns may be overstated. Kothari and Warner
(2006) argue that most return models employed in the event-time approach of calculat-
ing abnormal stock performance appear misspecified over different periods. Hence, to
mitigate the potential cross-sectional correlations and misspecification issues, previous
researchers suggest the calendar-time approach (Fama and French, 1996; Gompers and
Lerner, 2003; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007; Agathee et al., 2014). Here, we employ the
Fama and French (1993) 3-Factor model (FF3F), the Carhart (1997) Momentum model
(MOM) and liquidity-adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model (LCAPM). For calendar-
time approach, the preceding 36-months excess returns of IPO is regressed against the
4Size is calculated as the share price times the number of outstanding shares in June every
year.
5BTM ratio was calculated as book common equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year
t− 1, divided by the market equity at the end of December of t− 1.
12
factors over the whole study period to obtain the Jensen’s α value that indicates the
magnitude and direction of abnormal performance of the IPOs.
Fama-French 3-Factor Model (FF3F)
Fama and French (1993) report that firm size and book-to-market (BTM) values are
significant in explaining stock returns. In the same vein, Drew and Veeraraghavan
(2002) find evidence that the stock return variation in Malaysia are also explained by
size and BTM. Following Espenlaub et al. (2000) and Komenkul et al. (2012), we employ
FF3F model as a benchmark, in which the abnormal return is estimated as:
Rit −Rft = α+ βi(Rm −Rft) + βSMBSMBt + βHMLHMLt + it (13)
whereRit is the return on IPO stock i in month t, Rmt is the return on the market in event
month t calculated using the FBM KLCI; Rft is the 1-month Malaysian Government
Security return in month t; SMB is the value-weighted return on a portfolio of small
minus big firms; and HML is the value-weighted return on a portfolio of high book-
to-market (BTM) firms minus the value-weighted return on firms with low BTM. The
betas are estimated by regressing the preceding 36-month IPOi monthly excess returns
on the monthly market excess returns, book-to-market, and size factor returns for the
36-month estimation period.
The SMB and HML portfolios in Equation 13 are constructed using Fama and
French (1993) methodology by considering each event month t and sorting the stocks
listed in Bursa Malaysia by market capitalisation and book-to-market (BTM) value.
First, the stocks are segregated into small (S) and big (B) according to their market
capitalisation, divided using the median market capitalisation at end of June every year.
Next, the stocks are divided into three BTM groups based on the top 30% (low, L),
middle 40% (medium, M) and bottom 30% (high, H) BTM value. The BTM value is
the reciprocal of market-to-book value at the end of December each year. Finally, six
portfolios are constructed. They are: SL, SM, SH, BL, BM and BH. Then, the SMBt
value is derived from the difference between the average returns of small firms and big
firms. The HMLt value is the average returns of IPOs with high BTM ratio minus low
BTM ratio. Hence:
SMBt =
(SL+ SM + SH)
3
− (BL+BM +BH)
3
HMLt =
(SH + SL)
2
− (BH +BL)
2
Carhart Momentum Model (MOM)
Thomadakis et al. (2012) estimated the Carhart (1997) four-factor momentum
(MOM) model as a benchmark to calculate abnormal return of IPO in Greece and
reported that stock returns momentum is significant in explaining stock performance.
Securities returns in the previous period are found to have impact on returns (Carhart,
1997). We use the model in our study to assess its impact on abnormal returns on
Malaysian IPOs. The MOM model is defined as:
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Rit −Rft = α+ βi(Rm −Rft) + βSMBSMBt + βHMLHMLt + βMOMMOMtit (14)
where MOM is the value-weighted average return of the top 30% securities with the
maximum returns in the preceding year, and bottom 30% securities with the lowest
securities in the preceding year. The MOM value is derived from the difference between
returns of high-and-low momentum securities.
Liquidity-Adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model (L-CAPM)
In addition to FF3F and MOM models, we employ LCAPM that considers the
liquidity risk factor of a security, and presented as:
Rit −Rft = α+ βi(Rm −Rft) + βLIQLIQi + it (15)
where βLIQLIQi is the liquidity risk factor of stock i (Amihud, 2002), and calculated
as:
LIQit =
1
Diy
Diy∑
t=1
|rit|
Dvolit
(16)
where LIQiy is the measure of IPO firm i estimated in month t (Amihud, 2002); Dit is
the number of nonzero trading days in month t, |rit| is the absolute value of returns of
stock i in month t; and Dvolit is MYR trading volume for stock i in month t.
4 Findings
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We begin our analysis with the summary statistics. Table 2 provides the descriptive
statistics data, more specifically, the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum
of the market value, the gross proceeds and the initial returns of Malaysian IPOs. Panel
A in Table 2 presents the market value of the IPO firms in Malaysian Ringgit (MYR).
The total market capitalisation of the Main market IPOs is MYR195.28 billion (mean
= MYR659.73 million), and MYR10.92 billion (mean = MYR71.85 million) for the
ACE market. When the two markets are combined, the total market capitalisation
of the IPO firms is MYR205.70 billion (mean = MYR460.27 million). The mean size
(represented by the market capitalisation) of the Main market firms is notably higher
than the whole economy. This is driven by the fact that many of the Main market firms
are pronouncedly larger than the ACE market firms, and the whole market is dominated
by the Main market firms, giving it more weightage. The size of Main market IPO firms
is also more dispersed than the ACE market, as implied by the standard deviation of
3,351.70 and 58.57 for the respective markets. In the Main market, the size difference
between the largest and smallest IPO firms is extremely large, i.e. MYR40.32 billion
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for the largest and only MYR44 million for the smallest. The difference between the
maximum and minimum market values in the ACE market is much smaller. The highest
market capitalisation is MYR322 million, while the smallest is MYR16 million.
Panel B in Table 2 reports the statistics of offer size and indicates that on average
the offer size of Malaysian IPOs is MYR128.51 million. The Main market firms have
larger average issuance size (MYR186.99 million) as compared to their ACE market
counterparts (MYR14.61 million). The dispersion of issuance size in the Main market
is higher than the ACE market, as depicted by the standard deviation of 999.01 and
19.46 for the respective markets. The largest issuance is for Petronas Chemicals Group
Berhad (MYR 12.5 billion), while the smallest issuance is by Nikko Electronics Berhad.
Panel C in Table 2 displays the Initial Returns of IPOs and claim that the average
initial returns of Malaysian IPOs is 27%. The ACE market IPOs are more underpriced
than theACE market IPOs at 36% and 23% respectively, implying that the global phe-
nomenon of IPO underpricing also exists in the Malaysian markets. It is worth noting
that the listing regulation allows the ACE market to list younger firms, even those with-
out prior operational and financial track record. Hence, the information asymmetry
between investors and lPO firms is higher in the ACE market than in the Main market,
leading to the higher underpricing. Importantly, the underpricing reported during our
study period is lower than those recorded in previous studies in Malaysia (see Dawson
(1987): 166.7%; Yong (1991): 167.4%; Loughran et al. (1994): 80.3%; Paudyal et al.
(1998): 61.8%; Jelic et al. (2001): 99.1%; and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007): 95.2%). This
implies a downward trend in the underpricing of Malaysian IOPs, reflecting the increased
efficiency of the Malaysian market.
Panel D in Table 2 further illustrates the initial returns by sector groupings. As
can be seen from the Table, events in each industry have distinct impacts on IPOs and
the impact of sector characteristics on IPOs returns varies between sectors. For sector
groupings, we find that IPO underpricing is mainly dominated by the characteristics
associated with the Properties sector (4%,) followed by Technology and Trading and
Services sectors (35%). This is justified as Technology firms are generally younger and
smaller, thus suffered from higher ex ante uncertainty. In addition, the majority of those
firms are listed in the ACE market, which also partially explain the higher underpricing
found in the market.
[ Insert Table 2 about here ]
4.2 Event-Time Approach
4.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Now we move on to examine the performance of Malaysian IPOs in whole economy,
the Main (MM) and the ACE markets (AM), as well as sector groupings using the market
index and reference portfolio. While Panels A and B in Table 3 report the three-year
equally- and value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of Malaysian IPOs for
the whole market, Panel C presents the results of test of differences of the CARs between
the two markets.
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For equally-weighted cumulative abnormal return (EWCAR) using market index,
we find significant underperformance in the Main market (MM) IPOs at (-14.16%).
In contrast, the ACE market (AM) IPOs overperform less significantly at 19.0%. For
the reference portfolio, we find marginal underperformance (-0.9%) with MM IPOs and
overperformance at (6.9%) with AM IPOs.
When turning our attention to value-weighting scheme (Panel B), we found signifi-
cant evidence of underperformance (p < 0.001). Notably, the level of underperformance
intensified. This implies that larger firms tend to perform worse than smaller firms in
the long-run. Our findings are in contrast with previous findings in the Malaysian mar-
ket. For MM IPOs, our findings contradict previous studies on the Malaysian market.
For example, the findings associated with MM IPOs contradict with those reported by
Jelic et al. (2001); Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007). However, the findings for AM IPOs are
in line with Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect (2012) that report high underperformance in the
MESDAQ Market6. Based on the initial analysis, we find that the abnormal returns are
sensitive to benchmark and weighting scheme employed to calculate stock performances.
To determine whether the CAR results of MM and AM IPOs are significantly
different, using parametric (two-sample t-test) and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney test)
tests, our finding as seen in Panel C in Table 3 imply that the CAR of MM and AM
IPOs are significantly different when using market index. However, we find insignificant
evidence supporting the difference in CARs when using reference portfolio benchmark.
[ Insert Table 3 about here ]
To further examine the IPO performance in the 36-month period, we supplement
our result with trend analysis of three-year CARs. As illustrated in Figure 1, when using
equal weighting, we find that AM IPOs outperform both benchmarks throughout the
36-month period. The long-term positive EWCARs are driven by the high proportion of
firms that consistently generate monthly abnormal return of more than 100% throughout
the 36-month period. However, MM IPOs generate negative abnormal returns beginning
month 19 and 32 with market benchmark and reference portfolio, respectively. For value-
weighting estimates, we find that both that MM and AM IPOs underperform, and mainly
driven by large IPO firms. Notably, the abnormal return of AM IPOs significantly drops
when value-weighting scheme is adopted. The high underperformance is driven by the
constant negative monthly abnormal returns generated by the three largest IPOs in the
AM that represent 52% of the total market capitalisation of AM IPOs. To the end, the
subfigures included in Figure 1suggest that the return of AM IPOs are more volatile
than their MM counterparts.
4.2.2 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
Next is the abnormal return estimates using the buy-and-hold approach. We report
the equally-weighted (EWBHAR) and the value-weighted buy-and-hold (VWBHAR) in
Panels A and B in Table 4, respectively. Starting with the equally-weighted portfolio,
we find insignificant result across all markets and benchmarks, with the exception of the
6The ACE market was previously known as The MESDAQ Market.
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MM, with significant underperformance at 10% level. In contrast, although insignificant,
we note that AM IPOs overperform the market index.
The result is found to be sensitive to the benchmark used. With reference portfolio,
EWBHAR in MM IPOs turn to be overperforming (2.53%), while AM IPOs turn to be
underperforming (12.9%). For the VWBHAR reported in in Panel B in Table 4 there are
clear evidences supporting the underperformance across all markets and benchmarks 1
per cent level level of significance. Importantly, since BHAR reflects the actual investor
experience, the findings indicate that IPO is not a promising investment option in the
long run.
When the VWBHAR of the two markets are compared, we find MM IPOs perform
better than AM IPOs. This results are in line with Gregory et al. (2010) and Vismara
et al. (2012), but contradict with Komenkul et al. (2012). In agreement to the find-
ings reported with CAR, it is worth noting that the negative BHARs are magnified in
value-weighted portfolios. Overall, our EWBHAR results in are consistent with Paudyal
et al. (1998) and Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect (2012), but in contrast with Ahmad-Zaluki
et al. (2007). However, for VWBHAR, our findings are supportive to those reported
by Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007). In addition, the medians of MM and AM IPOs are
significantly different as indicated by the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test.
[ Insert Table 4 about here ]
As a further check to the movement of BHARs in the three year aftermarket, the
results are illustrated graphically in Figure 2. For the entire sample, our findings imply
that overoptimism exists in investors about the future prospect of the Malaysian IPOs.
The optimistic investors initially overvalue the IPOs and then, as more information are
available, they begin to revalue the IPOs pessimistically. Thus, the IPO returns are
driven downwards, which leads to the negative long-run abnormal returns.
For the value weighting, interestingly, we find that AM IPOs substantially under-
perform the reference portfolio by -71.16%. The result is dominated by the largest IPO
firm in the AM that unreasonably underperform (-51.11%.) in month 36. The result is
clearly a size effect and not an outlier. For the IPO firm, the raw return in the month is
only -3.2%, proportionally smaller than the worse performance in the month of -42.9%.
However, due to the fact that this firm represents 27% of the total market capitalisation
in AM portfolio, the BHAR is amplified.
4.3 Industry Effect on IPO Long-Run Abnormal Returns
In this section, we provide more robustness analysis by investigating industry effect.
We divide the samples into eight sector groupings based on the Bursa Malaysia sector
classification. The results of industry-specific CAR and BHAR are presented in Table 5
and in Figures 3. Focusing first on the three-year equally-weighted portfolio, it is evident
from the Table that the highest positive abnormal return is achieved by the IPOs in
Technology sector, for which the EWCAR is 50.45% (t-stat = 5.27). IPO firms classified
in the Trading and Services sector produce a three-year EWCAR of 21.93% (t-stat =
2.19).
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These findings suggest that investors may generate significant cumulative abnormal
return if they buy Technology IPOs at the closing price on the first trading day and hold
them for a 36-month period. The Malaysian government has taken initiatives to stimu-
late the growth of the Technology sector. For example, in 1996, the Multimedia Super
Corridor was established to attract local and foreign entrepreneurs to set up technology
companies in the country. In the regional IPO market, the Malaysian technology IPOs
play a competitive role, where the IPO firms tend to be the largest in terms of market
capitalisation.
Our EWBHAR findings further justify that the abnormal return is sensitive to the
methods employed. For example, in the Technology sector, while EWCAR is upward-
trending, EWBHAR shows a downward trend. When we turn attention to the value-
weighted portfolios, we find that the IPOs from the Technology sector is still outperform-
ing, which is similar to the case of the equally-weighted portfolios. Likewise, it can be
clearly seen in Figure 3 that VWCAR of IPOs in the Technology sector increase between
month 27 and 36, although we can also see some volatility. The volatility in abnormal
return mirrors the price volatility of the largest IPO in the technology portfolio. The
Consumer Products (−13.58%, t−stat = 13.58), Industrial (−21.40%, t−stat = −11.20)
and Trading and Services (−12.15%, t− stat = −8.36) sectors exhibit significant under-
performance in the long run. The Consumer Products and Industrial sectors consistently
exhibit underperformance regardless of methods employed. Notably, for Consumer Prod-
ucts sector, the underperformance is statistically significant with EWCAR, EWBHAR
and VWCAR methods. For Industrial sector, the results are significant only with VW-
CAR and VWBHAR. The industry analysis support our early observation that long-run
abnormal returns of IPOs are sensitive to the methodology employed to calculate stocks
performance. Our initial findings suggest that underperformance exists in both the
Main and ACE markets. Strikingly, based on the industry analysis, underperformance
is not wide-spread to all industries, but only appear in some sectors. The results also
persistently show that the abnormal returns are method-sensitive. Our industry-based
analysis shed the light that long-run abnormal performance return is not only related to
listing market, but also partially driven by sector groupings. The sector impact is more
apparent when a higher number of stocks are associated to a particular sector.
[ Insert Table 5 about here ]
4.4 Long-Run Abnormal Return Using Calendar-Time Ap-
proach
With event-time approach, long-run abnormal returns may suffer from cross-sectional
relations of IPOs (Brown and Warner, 1980). To mitigate the issue, we employ the
calendar-time portfolio approach as robustness test, using the Fama-French 3-factor
(FF3F) model (Fama and French, 1993), Carhart (1997) momentum model (MOM),
and liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM) (Amihud, 2002).
The dependent variables is defined as monthly returns on IPO portfolios between
January 2000 to December 2011. For the entire sample and the Main market IPOs, the
sample size covers a total of 143 months from March 2003 to December 2014. The ACE
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market was established in 2002. Thus, the sample size for the market covers 116 months,
beginning from May 2005. The maximum number of firms in the IPO portfolio in the
aggregate sample is 200, occurring in May 2009. The minimum number of observation
is 2, which occurred in February and March 2003. For the Main (ACE) Market samples,
the maximum number of firms in the IPO portfolio is 127 (105), occurring in March
2008 (November 2009). The minimum is 2 (3) which occurred in February and March
2003 (May to July 2005).
The equally-weighted and value weighted excess returns of the IPO portfolios re-
turns are regressed on risk premium (Rm − Rf ), small minus big (SMB), high minus
low (HML), momentum (MOM) and liquidity (LIQ) variables using the ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression. We perform the regression on the entire sample, and repeat
the procedure for the Main market and ACE market IPOs separately. The intercept α
from the regressions indicates the monthly risk-adjusted performance of the IPOs.
Focusing first on the equally-weighted portfolio and using all three asset pricing
models, our findings indicate that underperformance exist in MM IPOs as presented in
Panel A of Table 6. Notably, the abnormal return is only significant (p < 0.01) with
liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM), but not with the Fama and
French 3-Factor (FF3F) and the Carhart Momentum (MOM) models. The negative
intercept of -0.002 in the LCAPM model indicates that MM IPOs underperform at -
0.2% monthly, which turns to a -6.95% three-year abnormal return.7 Our results are in
line with previous studies (Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007; Moshirian et al., 2010; Su and
Bangassa, 2011; Agathee et al., 2014) For AM IPOs, seen in Panel B of Table 6, all our
models exhibit positive intercept, indicating overperformance in the IPOs. In agreement
with the findings associated with MM IPOs, the LCAPM model shows weak significance
at 10% level, but not in the FF3F and MOM models. Based on the LCAPM model, AM
IPOs overperform at 0.2% monthly, or 7.45% in three years.
[ Insert Table 6 about here ]
As a final robustness test, we repeat the regressions using value-weighted IPO port-
folio returns (Table 7). The results for MM IPOs are consistently showing underperfor-
mance, as can be seen in Panel B. Subsequently, for AM IPOs, we also report negative
intercepts for all models. The results, as shown in Panel C of Table 7, suggest that AM
IPOs also underperform in the long-run.
Our calendar-time regressions provide stronger supports to our event-time results
that MM IPOs significantly underperform in the long-run. Due to the larger proportion
of MM IPOs to AM IPOs in terms of size and number of IPOs, the abnormal return
in the whole sample is heavily influenced by the behaviour of MM IPOs. Hence, in
aggregate, the Malaysian IPOs underperform in the period of 36-month aftermarket.
To conclude, our analysis using calendar-time show strong evidence of underper-
formance in MM and AM IPOs, and also at the overall economy level. The underper-
formance are higher in AM, which is in line with Ritter’s (1991) hypothesis that higher
underpricing will lead to higher underperformance. The statistical significance is par-
ticularly stronger (p < 0.001) with value-weighted portfolio, indicating that size effect
7The three-year abnormal return is calculated as: (1− 0.002)36 − 1.
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plays a role in driving abnormal returns. As the underperformance tend to be higher
in value-weighted portfolio, this implies that larger IPOs tend to perform worse in the
long-run. All in all, the results here answer our research questions of whether under-
performance exists in the Malaysian market, and whether the Main and ACE markets
portray different long-run abnormal performance.
[ Insert Table 7 about here ]
5 Conclusion
Most of the previous literature claim that stocks of firms that go public underper-
form their peers over the two to five years following their issue date. This long-term
abnormal return anomaly is a debatable and puzzled issue that contradicts all forms of
the efficient market hypothesis. The major purpose of this paper is to investigate the
long-term stock performance of 448 Malaysian IPOs listed between 2000 and 2011 in
the Main and ACE alternative markets. The three-year stock returns of the IPOs were
investigated using cumulative abnormal return (CAR), buy-and-hold abnormal return
(BHAR) and wealth relatives (WR). We employ the market index, size/book-to-market
matched reference portfolio and eight industry indexes returns as benchmarks, and utilise
more robust statistical tests. The calendar-time approach based on the market model
with additional liquidity factor as well as Fama-French and Carhart models were applied
for verifying long-run abnormal returns.
Based on our analysis, we draw four important findings. Firstly, in line with the
majority of the literature, the anomaly of long-run underperformance also exists in the
Malaysian market. In addition, we find distinguishable long-run performance between
IPOs during pre-and post-2000 period. Unlike the IPOs listed in the post-2000 period, we
find that Malaysian IPOs generally overperform in the period of 36-month aftermarket,
indicating that the publicly available information is reflected on the IPO performance
and the market is relatively efficient. Secondly, there is evidence supportive of the
differences in the long-run performance of the Main and ACE market IPOs. Further,
we found that the ACE market IPOs are more underperformed, and its investors are
more optimistic about the future prospect of the IPOs compared to the Main market
investors. However, given the characteristics of the Main market that generally lists
more mature and financially stable firms, the overall IPOs performance show a lower
level of risk and hence reflect a lower rate of expected returns by investors. This is in
favour of the hypothesis that IPOs with better initial returns are the worst long-run
performer. Furthermore, although underperformance exists in the Malaysian market as
a whole, the anomaly is not wide-spread throughout all sector groupings. We found
that the Consumer Products and Industrial sectors underperform in the long-run, while
the Construction, Property and Technology sectors overperform along with a significant
variation in the level of abnormal returns across sector groupings. Finally, our findings
are robust to a wide range of sensitivity checks including parametric and non-parametric
tests.
Overall, our paper illustrates the long-term stock performance of Malaysian IPOs in
the Main and ACE alternative stock markets at economy and industry level. Therefore,
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our study offers insights to policy maker interested in pricing future new security offer-
ings. For issuing firms, our results provides them with rooms for price adjustments by
reducing information asymmetry in general and between investors. Finally, the results
presented in this study may have broader policy implications for many other emerging
markets similar to Malaysia, which are expanding globally by implementing economic,
trade and financial reforms. Our findings may be, therefore, also helpful for regulators
overseeing other emerging markets beyond Malaysia.
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Table 1: Distribution of Malaysian IPOs Listed Between 2000 and 2011
Entire Sample % of Total Main market IPOs % of Total ACE market IPOs % of Total
Panel A: IPO sample distribution by year and listing board
2000 38 8.48 38 12.88 n/a n/a
2001 20 4.46 20 6.78 n/a n/a
2002 49 10.94 43 14.58 6 3.92
2003 56 12.50 37 12.54 19 12.42
2004 69 15.40 39 13.22 30 19.61
2005 72 16.07 26 8.81 46 30.07
2006 35 7.81 14 4.75 21 13.73
2007 21 4.69 18 6.10 3 1.9
2008 22 4.91 14 4.75 8 5.23
2009 14 3.13 11 3.73 3 1.96
2010 27 6.03 21 7.12 6 3.92
2011 25 5.58 14 4.75 11 7.19
Total 448 295 153
Panel B: IPO sample distribution by industry and listing board
Construction 7 1.56 7 2.36 0 0.00
Consumer Products 86 19.20 80 27.03 6 3.95
Industrial 138 30.80 110 37.16 28 18.42
Heavy Machinery 21 4.69 5 1.69 16 10.53
Plantation 9 2.01 9 3.04 0 0.00
Property 12 2.68 12 4.05 0 0.00
Technology 93 20.76 13 4.39 80 52.63
Trading and Services 82 18.30 60 20.27 22 14.47
Total 448 296 152
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Market Value, Gross Proceeds and Initial Returns of Malaysian
IPOs
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Market Value of IPOs (MYR million)
All IPOs (n=448) 460.27 2,737.28 16.00 40,320.00
MM (n=296) 659.73 3,351.70 44.00 40,320.00
AM (n=152) 71.85 58.57 16.00 322.00
Panel B: Gross Proceeds of IPOs (MYR million)
All IPOs 128.51 815.70 0.05 12,499.20
MM 186.99 999.01 0.05 12,499.20
AM 14.61 10.46 1.10 80.80
Panel C: Initial Returns of IPOs by Markets
All IPOs 0.27 0.48 -0.71 2.64
MM 0.23 0.37 -0.39 1.94
AM 0.36 0.63 -0.71 2.64
Panel D: Initial Returns of IPOs by Industry
Construction 0.27 0.36 -0.01 1.05
Consumer Products 0.27 0.44 -0.67 1.80
Industrial 0.20 0.40 -0.71 2.64
Heavy Machinery 0.32 0.37 -0.26 0.93
Plantation 0.16 0.19 -0.06 0.60
Properties 0.04 0.22 -0.29 0.42
Technology 0.35 0.61 -0.51 2.46
Trading and Services 0.35 0.53 -0.52 2.62
MYR1 is equivalent to USD0.2860 as at 31 December 2014 (Source: Bank Negara Malaysia).
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Table 3: Three-year Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Market Index Reference Portfolio
CAR (%) Para.
t-stat
Para. Adj
t-stat
Non-para.
s-stat
CAR (%) Para.
t-stat
Para. Adj
t-stat
Non-para.
s-stat
Panel A: Equally-weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (EWCAR)
All IPOs -2.86 -0.69 -0.72 -1.92* 1.70 0.40 0.69 -0.45
MM -14.16 -3.05** -3.72** -4.11*** -0.90 -0.19 -0.18 -1.09
AM 19.23 2.40* 2.83* 2.16* 6.90 0.80 0.43 0.59
Panel B: Value-weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (VWCAR)
All IPOs -24.20 -23.05*** -13.74*** -6.01*** -15.10 -23.49*** -13.26*** -10.23***
MM -20.44 -18.94*** -11.65*** -9.43*** -10.66 -18.4*** -12.06*** -9.72***
AM -47.16 -14.90*** -8.59*** -7.90*** -34.64 -7.262*** -7.094*** -5.32**
Panel C: Main market vs ACE market IPOs
Para.
t-stat
Non-para.
z-stat
Para.
t-stat
Non-para.
z-stat
EWCAR -3.86*** 3.96*** -0.855 0.99
VWCAR -4.32*** 4.02*** -5.33 4.52
[1] The abnormal returns are calculated up to a 36-month period post-listing, excluding the initial return. Market indices returns and size/book-to-market
matching portfolio return are used as benchmarks.
[2] The parametric conventional t-statistics (Para. t-stat) and Crude Dependence Test (Para. Adj t-stat) are the two-tailed results of the null hypothesis that
the means are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (Non-para. s-stat) is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal
return in zero. Panel C indicate the difference in mean and median between Main and ACE market IPOs, based on the parametric independent t-test and the
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
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Table 4: Three-year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
Market Index Reference Portfolio
BHAR
(%)
Para.
t-stat
Non-
para.
Adj
t-stat
Non-
para.
s-stat
Wealth
Rela-
tive
(WR)
BHAR
(%)
Para.
t-stat
Non-
para.
Adj
t-stat
Non-
para.
s-stat
Wealth
Rela-
tive
(WR)
Panel A: Equally-weighted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (EWBHAR)
All IPOs -6.55 -1.23 -1.67 -7.25*** 0.94 -2.69 -0.03 0.02 -5.21*** 0.98
MM -12.85 -1.93* -1.87 -6.61 0.9 2.53 0.38 -0.42 -3.28** 1.02
AM 5.77 0.48 0.36 -3.28** 1.06 -12.90 0.80 0.93 -4.21*** 0.89
Panel B: Value-weighted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (VWBHAR)
All IPOs -35.77 -10.27*** -12.73*** -5.01*** 0.74 -31.27 -8.17*** -918*** -10.23*** 1.1
MM -35.31 -9.02*** -10.57*** -8.73*** 0.71 -21.80 -5.17*** -6.06*** -9.72*** 0.81
AM -37.74 -4.83*** -5.43*** -9.80*** 0.76 -71.16 -8.97*** 7.09*** -5.32** 0.64
Panel C: Main market vs ACE market IPOs
t-stat z-stat t-stat z-stat
EWBHAR 1.57 2.23* -0.855 0.99
VWBHAR 1.43 2.38* -5.33 4.52
[1] The parametric conventional t-statistics (Para. t-stat) and the non-parametric skewness-adjusted bootstrapped t-statistic (Non-para. Adj. t-stat.) are the
two-tailed results of the null hypothesis that the means are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (Non-para. s-stat) is used to test the
null hypothesis that the median abnormal return in zero. Panel C indicate the difference in mean and median between Main and ACE market IPOs, based on
the parametric independent t-test and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
[2] Refer to Table 3 for explanation on tests of differences.
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Table 5: Three-year Abnormal Returns Based on Sector Groupings
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
CAR
(%)
Para.
t-stat
Para.
Adj
t-stat
Non-
para.
s-stat
BHAR
(%)
Para.
t-stat
Non-
para.
Adj
t-stat
Non-
para.
s-stat
Wealth
Relative
(WR)
Panel A: Equally-weighted Portfolios
Construction 19.63 0.70 0.94 0.85 35.67 0.92 0.05 0.68 1.31
Consumer Products -46.61 -6.89*** -6.72** -4.75*** -52.95 -1.70* -1.55 -6.10*** 0.96
Industrial -9.44 -1.27 -1.07 -1.51 -1.06 -0.33 -0.53 -3.42*** 0.98
Heavy Machinery -23.79 -1.32 -1.65 -0.94 -8.49 -1.04 -1.43 -3.35*** 0.92
Plantation 2.18 0.07 0.16 0.77 -54.26 0.12 0.02 -0.89 1.04
Property 16.52 0.60 0.22 0.16 0.43 -0.09 -0.57 -0.31 0.98
Technology 50.45 5.27*** 4.37** 0.92 18.57 0.03 0.94 -4.46*** 1
Trading and Services 21.93 2.19* 2.22* 1.45 20.13 0.32 0.33 -0.05 1.02
Panel B: Value-weighted Portfolios
Construction 35.67 2.55* 0.36 0.49 26.55 2.61* 2.71* 0.48 1.23
Consumer Products -4.00 -13.58*** 17.31*** 15.51*** -59.95 -0.17 -0.17 -7.70 0.99
Industrial -21.40 -11.20*** -4.57*** 9.24*** -26.78 -5.28*** -6.35*** -4.32*** 0.99
Heavy Machinery 14.30 2.70* 2.56* 2.84* -42.60 -6.15*** -6.89 -3.32* 0.89
Plantation 2.33 0.77 0.39 0.41 -0.69 0.45 0.61 0.79 1.43
Property 12.86 3.33** 1.98* 1.45* 19.70 -1.41 -1.47 -0.37 0.82
Technology 50.46 10.52*** 5.56*** 6.52*** 5.04 -2.82** -3.01** -5.54** 0.99
Trading and Services -12.15 -8.36*** -6.25*** -7.35*** -20.02 2.69** 2.75** 4.35** 1.03
Refer to Table 3 for explanation on calculations of abnormal returns, and Tables 3 and 4 for explanation on calculations of tests of differences for CAR and
BHAR respectively.
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Table 6: Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns Using Equally-Weighted Portfolio
α βRm−Rf βSMB βHML βMOM βLIQ Adj. R
2
Panel A: All IPOs
FF3F Model -0.004 0.565*** 0.057 -0.065
(-0.008) (-0.104) (-0.213) (-0.228)
MOM Model -0.003 0.575*** 0.096 -0.063 -0.068 0.225
(-0.008) (-0.105) (-0.211) (-0.226) (-0.099)
LCAPM Model -0.002** 0.150* -0.001**
(-0.009) (-0.126) (-0.002) 0.222
Panel B: Main market IPOs
FF3F Model -0.005 0.587*** 0.055 -0.046 0.239
(-0.008) (-0.101) (-0.213) (-0.231)
MOM Model -0.005 0.595*** 0.090 -0.045 -0.061 0.240
(-0.008) (-0.103) (-0.213) (-0.230) (-0.107)
LCAPM Model -0.002** 0.158 -0.001** 0.301
-0.007 -0.124 (-0.002)
Panel C: ACE market IPOs
FF3F Model 0.000 0.401** 0.058 -0.013 0.084
(-0.009) (-0.165) (-0.265) (-0.279)
MOM Model 0.000 0.406** 0.090 -0.012 -0.056 0.085
(-0.009) (-0.166) (-0.265) (-0.279) (-0.070)
LCAPM Model 0.002* 0.204 0.001** 0.085
(-0.008) (-0.168) -0.002
This table presents the regression results of calendar-time market-adjusted monthly abnormal returns using the following models: (1) Fama-French 3-factor
model FF3F): Rit −Rft = αi + βi(Rm −Rft) + βSMBSMBt + βHMLHMLt + it where Rit is the return on IPO stock i in month t, Rmt is the return on the
market in event month t calculated using the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (FBM KLCI), Rft is the 1-month Malaysian Government
Security return in month t, SMB is the value-weighted return on a portfolio of small minus big firms, and HML is the value-weighted return a portfolio of high
book-to-market (BTM) firms minus the value-weighted return on firms with low BTM; (2) Carhart (1997) four-factor model, with momentum (MOM) factor
added to the FF3F equation, representing the difference between returns of high-and-low momentum securities in the previous year; and (3) the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) with controlling liquidity factor (LCAPM). The t-statistics (shown in brackets) are calculated using the time-series standard deviation
of the mean monthly abnormal returns. The statistical significance is generated after White heteroskedasticity adjustments. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
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Table 7: Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns Using Value-Weighted Portfolio
α βRm−Rf βSMB βHML βMOM βLIQ Adj. R
2
Panel A: All IPOs
FF3F Model -0.00003 0.49200*** 0.00104 0.00083 0.13500
(-0.00005) (-0.13300) (-0.00119) (-0.00154)
MOM Model -0.00003 0.49900*** 0.00125 0.00084 -0.00037 0.13700
(-0.00005) (-0.13700) (-0.00120) (-0.00153) (-0.00069)
LCAPM Model -0.0129 0.04290 0.00099
(-0.01000) -0.19900 (-0.01050)
Panel B: Main market IPOs
FF3F Model -0.00005 0.53500*** 0.00103 0.00090 0.14500
(-0.00005) (-0.14800) (-0.00127) (-0.00163)
MOM Model -0.00005 0.540*** 0.00117 0.00091 -0.00025 0.14600
(-0.00005) (-0.15400) (-0.00130) (-0.00162) (-0.00084)
LCAPM Model -0.0155 0.07670 0.00149 0.16400
(-0.00780) -0.13680 (-0.00170)
Panel C: ACE market IPOs
FF3F Model -0.00342*** 0.50300*** 0.0683* -0.02990 0.59200
(-0.00109) (-0.05540) (-0.03730) (-0.03290)
MOM Model -0.00343*** 0.502*** 0.0666* -0.03000 0.00299
(-0.00108) (-0.05570) (-0.03870) (-0.03310) (-0.01840) 0.59200
LCAPM Model -0.00128 0.15420 -0.0002**
(-0.35800) (-0.60600) (-0.94900)
See Table 6 for detailed description.
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(d) VWCAR (reference portfolio Portfolio Benchmark)
Figure 1: Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
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(d) VWBHAR (reference portfolio Portfolio Benchmark)
Figure 2: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
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(b) EWBHAR by Sector Groupings
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(c) VWCAR by Sector Groupings
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(d) VWBHAR by Sector Groupings
Figure 3: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns by Sector Groupings
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